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Abstract
Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free 
creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also 
allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some 
philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of 
possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose one way 
rather than another. Arguments like this depend on the principle of indifference. But that principle is 
rejected by most philosophers of probability. Some philosophers claim that a low probability should 
be assigned because doing otherwise violates intuitions about freewill. But such arguments can be 
addressed through strategies commonly employed to defend theories with counterintuitive results 
across ethics and metaphysics.
 Suppose Molinism is true. Then what are 
the odds that no matter who God created or 
what circumstances He put them in, they 
would do evil? According to a common claim, 
the odds are very small. I argue that a lesson 
from the fine- tuning literature casts doubt on 
this claim. I then reply to a series of objec-
tions. The objections may be addressed by 
combining further applications of the lesson 
with assumptions available to the Molinist 
about probability, freewill, observational bias, 
error theory, explanation, and paraphrase. 
This is relevant to theodicy. If God were un-
able to create a world with free creatures but 
no evil, it would form part of the explanation 
of why God allows evil.
2. The Lesson
 The universe appears to be fine- tuned for 
life. Take, for example, the gravitational 
constant. Our best physics tells us that the 
1 Introduction
Imagine God is deciding what to create. 
One of His options is to create free creatures. 
One of the things informing His decision is 
knowledge about what those creatures would 
do. If He were to create St. Francis and 
put him in the mountains, he would freely 
choose to contemplate the beauty of nature. 
If He were to create me and allow me to be 
offered a bribe, I would freely choose to take 
the bribe. There seem to be truths about what 
free creatures like us would do if we were 
put in various circumstances. And, in decid-
ing who to create and what circumstances 
to arrange, it seems that God is informed by 
these truths. Finally, it seems that such truths 
are not decided by God. For if they were, the 
creatures those truths are about would not be 
free. This is the Molinist doctrine of God’s 
providence.
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gravitational constant did not have to take 
the value it actually took. It could have been 
anything from zero to infinity. Our best 
physics also tells us that if the gravitational 
constant had been slightly different, then life 
would not exist. A natural reaction to this is 
to think that it must have been very unlikely 
that the universe would be life permitting. 
But what is the motivation for this reaction? 
The standard view is that it is motivated, 
often just implicitly, by the following line 
of reasoning: Only a very small range of the 
values the gravitational constant could have 
taken are life permitting. We have no reason 
to think it was more likely to take any one 
of these values than any of the others. So, 
we should assign equal probability to each 
of the values it could have taken. Such an 
assignment makes it very unlikely that the 
gravitational constant would fall within the 
life permitting range. This reasoning relies 
on:
Indifference: Whenever there is no evidence 
favoring one possibility over another, they have 
the same probability.
 Indifference is rejected by some philoso-
phers due to Bertrand’s Parado: Imagine a 
factory produces cubes with side- length be-
tween zero and one foot. The question “What 
is the probability that a randomly chosen 
cube has side length between zero and half 
a foot?” is logically equivalent to the ques-
tion “What is the probability that a randomly 
chosen cube has face area between zero and 
one fourth square feet?” However, applying 
Indifference to the first question gives the 
result that the probability is one half. And 
applying Indifference to the second question 
gives the result that the probability is one 
fourth. So, Indifference gives inconsistent 
answers to logically equivalent questions. 
And it must be rejected.
 Setting aside Bertrand’s Paradox, there 
are two remaining problems. First, there is 
the Normalization Problem. It is impossible 
to apply Indifference to cases involving infi-
nitely many possibilities in such a way that 
the sum of all the relevant probabilities adds 
up to one. As McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 
(2001, pp. 1031–2) put it:
[T]here is no way to “add up” the regions . . . 
so as to make them sum to one. If they have 
any sum, it is infinite. . . . Working from bare 
logical possibilities, it seems unreasonable to 
suggest that any one range of values for the 
constants is more probable a priori than any 
other similar range.
 Second, if we say that the probability of 
such possibilities is zero, then this leads to 
the Coarse- Tuning Problem. No matter how 
big the life permitting region turned out to be, 
the probability that the gravitational constant 
would fall within that region is zero. As Coly-
van, Garfield, and Priest (2005, pp. 327–8) 
put it:
[S]imilar reasoning shows that an infinitely 
sharp dart cannot hit a dart board, no matter how 
big the board is; or that no one can win a lottery 
that has infinitely many tickets. . . . This does 
not, however, relieve the defender of the fine- 
tuning argument of the burden of proof. Anyone 
advancing this argument must demonstrate that 
the probability that the physical constants take 
life- supporting values is low.
 Given the small life permitting range of 
values the gravitational constant could have 
taken, it is tempting to infer that a world with 
life has a low probability. But this inference 
is based on Indifference. And Indifference 
is false. The motivation for the claim that 
it is unlikely that the universe would be life 
permitting is significantly reduced. This sug-
gests2:
The Lesson: Do not use Indifference to assign 
probabilities in ignorance, especially when the 
number of possibilities is infinite.
3. Depravity
 Consider Counterfactuals of Freedom. Let 
S be a subject, A be an action, and C be a 
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complete specification of the laws of nature 
and the history of the world up to the instant 
of time at which S is faced with the decision 
to A. Now consider: “If S were in C, then S 
would freely perform A.” Any counterfactual 
with a form like this is a counterfactual of 
freedom. Next, consider Libertarianism. This 
is the view that a subject’s performance of an 
action is free only if the history of the world 
together with the laws of nature do not entail 
that the subject performs that action. Molin-
ism, then, is the doctrine that libertarianism 
is true3, that some counterfactuals of freedom 
are true and have their truth- values prior to 
creation, that their truth- values are not up to 
God, that God knew the truth- values of all 
counterfactuals of freedom prior to creation, 
and that God made use of this knowledge in 
His decision about what to create. Let’s also 
assume that God has the traditional attributes 
including omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnibenevolence. Finally, let’s say that a 
circumstance for a free creature is any situa-
tion in which that creature is allowed to make 
a free decision. Now consider4:
Depravity: If Molinism is true, then no matter 
who God created and no matter what circum-
stances He put them in, they would have done 
evil.
 Many people claim that we should assign 
a low probability to Depravity. As Adams 
(1977, pp. 116–7) puts it:
It is worth asking, therefore, whether the hy-
pothesis of universal trans- world depravity is 
plausible. . . . [T]here is an infinite variety of 
natural and supernatural ways in which God can 
work on us. . . . Molina held that both Jesus and 
Mary were preserved from all sin throughout 
their whole lives by God supplying them with 
gifts and aids that He knew would always elicit 
a favorable free response from them. Presum-
ably He could have done the same for others.
 As Pruss puts it4:
It seems very likely that given Molinism and 
an infinite number of possible people to choose 
from, God could choose to create a large group 
that all choose rightly. There is no guarantee that 
God could do so, but it is extremely unlikely that 
the conditionals of free will would not allow it.
 As Rasmussen (2004, pp. 459–60) puts it:
[W]hile it is possible that every essence suffers 
from TWD, the probability that every essence 
suffers from transworld depravity is zero, if the 
number of personal essences is infinite.
 As Zimmerman (2009, p. 75) puts it:
[T]here was a chance, however small (though 
perhaps no smaller than the chances of tran-
sworld depravity), that God had found himself 
confronted by essences each of which displays 
transworld manipulability.
 Plantinga (1974) himself, who first in-
troduced Depravity in connection with the 
logical problem of evil, is careful to insist 
that Depravity is mere a logical possibility 
and never claims that it has anything above 
a low probability. Plantinga’s (2004) own 
Molinist theodicy makes no use of Depravity. 
Thus, many people believe:
The Common Claim: We should assign a low 
probability to Depravity.
 If these authors are right, and the Common 
Claim is true, this significantly reduces the 
relevance of Depravity to theodicy.
4. The Argument from  
Fine- Tuning’s Lesson
 The Lesson supports an argument against 
the Common Claim:
(1) The Lesson is true.
(2) If the Lesson is true, then the Common 
Claim is false.
(3) Therefore, the Common Claim is false.
 (1) is motivated by Bertrand’s Paradox 
and the Normalization and Coarse- Tuning 
Problems.
 My initial defense of (2) relies on the idea 
that, given Molinism, we are in the dark 
about which distribution of truth- values to 
the counterfactuals of freedom God would 
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end up working with prior to creation. This 
is just as, given our best physics, we are in 
the dark about which value the gravitational 
constant would take prior to creation. We have 
no reason to think God would end up work-
ing with one distribution rather than another. 
For this reason, it is tempting to use Indiffer-
ence to assign probabilities to the relevant 
distributions. But if the Lesson is true, then 
Indifference is false due to Bertrand’s Para-
dox. And, even setting that aside, there are 
infinitely many counterfactuals of freedom 
about infinitely many possible people and 
infinitely many ways to assign truth- values to 
them. So, applying Indifference would lead 
to variants of the Normalization and Coarse- 
Tuning Problems. So, we should not assign a 
low probability to Depravity and, therefore, 
the Common Claim is false.
 My considered defense of (2) will rely on 
an examination of various ways in which one 
might try to get the result that the probability 
of Depravity is low without appealing to In-
difference. I argue that further applications of 
the Lesson together with other assumptions 
the Molinist may embrace allow for replies 
to the objections.
5. Objections and Replies
 First Objection: We are not in the dark 
about the probabilities of the distributions of 
truth- values to the counterfactuals of free-
dom. We can just look at how free creatures 
actually behave and extrapolate from that.
 Reply: The proponent of this objection 
might have a point. But if so, their point 
supports the claim that the probability of 
Depravity is high. After all, when we look at 
how people actually behave, they all do evil. 
So, it must have been very likely that God 
would get stuck with free creatures that would 
all do evil. Compare: a fine- tuning skeptic 
might suggest that we aren’t in the dark about 
how likely it is that the gravitational constant 
would fall within the life permitting range. 
After all, life exists doesn’t it? So, it must 
have been very likely that the gravitational 
constant would end up somewhere in the life 
permitting range.
 Second Objection: Free creatures seem to 
be good at not gouging out their eyes6. Sup-
pose God creates a free creature and com-
mands him not to gouge his eye. Suppose this 
is the only free being God ever creates and 
that this is the only free choice God ever gives 
him. Extrapolating from our own behavior, 
we can predict that he wouldn’t gouge out 
his eye. So, it seems very likely that God 
could have created someone and put him in 
circumstances in which he would not have 
done anything evil7.
 Reply: The proponent of Depravity should 
accept:
Biased Observations: Absent divinely- induced 
bias, intuitions about how merely possible free 
creatures would behave are unreliable.
 It is not as though we randomly selected 
possible free creatures and watched them 
behave across a randomly selected range 
of possible circumstances. We observe free 
creatures and free decisions that were hand 
picked by God out of all the possible free 
creatures and free decisions He could have 
actualized. Furthermore, we do not have a 
large sample of observations of the behavior 
of free creatures in circumstances that are 
very unusual. Imagine, then, that almost all 
counterfactuals of freedom that say a free 
creature does something right are false. But, 
occasionally, God finds a true one that says 
a free creature in a highly populated world 
does what is right. And, very rarely, God finds 
a few true ones that say free creatures in the 
same highly populated world act rightly. And, 
exceedingly rarely, God finds a cluster of 
true counterfactuals of freedom about a large 
number of free creatures in the very same 
world saying that they often do right. But 
God is never able to find a collection of true 
counterfactuals of freedom that say together 
that all creatures in the same world always, or 
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even almost always, do what is right. Given 
Biased Observations, for all we know a sce-
nario like this is actual and so the creature in 
the example would gouge his eyes out.
 Third Objection: Molinism must allow 
that a free creature’s choices are responsive 
to desires and reasons.8 So, the probability 
that a free creature would choose a certain 
way is a function of that creature’s desires 
and reasons in such a way that the stronger 
the desires and reasons for a choice are over 
the alternatives, the closer the probability the 
creature will make that choice is to one. So, 
God can make a free creature’s choice for 
what is right be as likely as He wishes by 
making its desires and reasons in favor of the 
right over the wrong be as strong as possible.
 Reply: The proponent of Depravity should 
accept:
Unequal Weight: Free creatures are responsive 
to desires and reasons in such a way that not 
all desires and reasons have the same weight in 
moving them to act.
 One Depravity friendly scenario concerns:
R1: Being the originator of the world’s evil.
R2: The triumph of good over evil.
R3: Flourishing in the face of suffering.
 Suppose the probability a free creature 
will do evil for the sake of R1 is one minus 
infinitesimal no matter what other desires or 
reasons it has and the probability it will do 
good is zero plus infinitesimal unless that 
creature has R2 or R3 among its reasons. 
In that case, for any free creature that exists 
in any world that does not yet contain evil, 
that creature would have the opportunity to 
introduce evil on the basis of R1. And that 
creature would not yet have the opportunity 
to do anything good on the basis of R2 or R3. 
The probability that such a creature would do 
evil rather than good in that case is one minus 
infinitesimal.
 Fourth Objection: Even if free creatures 
respond to R1, R2, and R3 in the way I have 
specified, that is not enough to secure De-
pravity. God could create creatures that do 
not know that they have the opportunity for 
introducing evil (e.g., they might not know 
that evil hasn’t already been introduced). 
He could create creatures for which R1 just 
wouldn’t occur as a reason because He’d 
prevent them from having R1 occur to them 
(and instead have some other reason occur to 
them).
 Reply: R1 by itself is insufficient to secure 
Depravity. Nevertheless, Depravity may be 
secured with either R2 or R3. If free creatures 
behave in such a way that they will choose 
evil over good unless there is evil to over-
come, then that is enough for Depravity to 
be true. If free creatures will choose evil over 
good unless they have the option of striving 
to flourish in reaction to suffering, then that 
is enough for Depravity to be true. To avoid 
this, God would have to deceive the first free 
creature by making it believe that either evil 
already exists or that it has suffering to over-
come when it does not. But God is unable to 
engage in such deception.9 So, Depravity is 
true.
 Fifth Objection: Rasmussen (2004) shows 
that Depravity is false. His argument relies 
not on Indifference but:
PPC: All counterfactuals of freedom should be 
assigned probabilities between zero and one.
 So (2) is false.
 Reply: Rasmussen holds that “PPC is based 
on the plausible supposition that if there are 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then 
they are metaphysically contingent.” So PPC 
is motivated by:
Regularity: All contingent propositions should 
be assigned probabilities between zero and one.
 Regularity is rejected by Easwaran (2014), 
Pruss (2013) and (2014), and Williamson 
(2007). As Fitelson and Hájek (forthcoming, 
p. 4) put it, “Probability theory and statis-
tics are shot through with non- trivial zero- 
probability events. . . . [G]enuine possibilities 
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that receive probability 0, and interesting ones 
at that.”
 Sixth Objection: Rasmussen- style argu-
ments can be constructed with:
Independence: Counterfactuals of freedom 
about creatures in radically different circum-
stances are statistically independent.
 There are infinitely many radically different 
circumstances in which God could put a first 
free creature. Given Independence, there must 
be infinitely many statistically independent 
counterfactuals of freedom about them. It is 
very likely that some of them will come out 
in such a way that Depravity is false.
 Reply: The proponent of Depravity should 
assume that what makes differences in cir-
cumstances generate statistical independence 
is that they provide free creatures with distinct 
reasons and desires. The circumstances of 
any first creature will be similar to the cir-
cumstances of any other such creature in one 
respect: They will have R1 as a reason to do 
evil but not R2 or R3 as a reason to do good. 
So, if free creatures are responsive to R1, 
R2, and R3 in the way discussed above, then 
the circumstances of all first free creatures 
in all possible circumstances will be similar 
in such a way that they are not statistically 
independent. The probability that all first free 
creatures will do evil is one minus infinitesi-
mal. This result is compatible with an even 
stronger assumption:
Complete Independence: All counterfactuals of 
freedom are statistically independent.
 If free creatures with R1 but not R2 or R3 
have probability of one minus infinitesimal of 
doing evil, then the probability of Depravity is 
not low even if all counterfactuals of freedom 
are statistically independent. On the other 
hand, if one rejects Complete Independence 
and maintains that counterfactuals of freedom 
about creatures with the same reasons and 
desires are not statistically independent, then 
one can respond to these objections with a 
much weaker assumption: Suppose the prob-
ability a free creature with R1 but not R2 or 
R3 will do evil is .3. Then, given that free 
creatures with the same reasons and desires 
will act in the same ways, the probability 
that all first free creatures will do evil in the 
first free choice is .3. So, the probability of 
Depravity is not particularly low.
 Seventh Objection: I have been explor-
ing two distributions of truth- values to the 
counterfactuals of freedom that are friendly 
to Depravity.
D1: Absent divinely- induced bias, free creatures 
will nearly always choose evil over good.
D2: Free creatures respond to reasons and 
desires in such a way that as a world’s evil is 
decreased, the probability that such creatures 
will choose evil is increased.
 Endorsing either of these requires denying 
intuitive and commonsense claims about how 
freewill works.
 Reply: The proponent of Depravity should 
accept:
Outweighed: The cost of denying intuitive, 
commonsense claims is outweighed by
(i) a significant gain in explanatory power,
(ii) an independently motivated error theory, 
and
(iii) the ability to provide systematic and useful 
paraphrases of the relevant claims.
 Lewis (1986) uses (i) to defend modal 
realism. He grants that the view is extremely 
counterintuitive and that the incredulous stare 
is a cost of the theory.10 But he suggests that, 
nevertheless, the explanatory power of modal 
realism outweighs its counterintuitiveness. 
Smolin (2001) and contributors to Leslie 
(1998) use (i) to defend the multiverse hy-
pothesis. It may be, as Wallace (2012, p. 421) 
puts it, “surprising- perhaps even shocking- 
and highly counterintuitive” to posit a multi-
verse. But the explanatory power of doing so, 
such authors suggest, outweighs the counter-
intuitiveness of the multiverse hypothesis. In 
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the case at hand, the truth of Depravity would 
explain why God allows evil. For if Depravity 
is true, then God was unable to create a world 
in which free creatures always refrained from 
evil. That is a significant gain in explanatory 
power.
 (ii) has been used to defend mereological 
universalism and nihilism (Rose and Schaf-
fer, 2017), rejection of the passage of time 
and rejection of endurantism (Paul, 2010), 
eliminativism about consciousness (Dennett, 
1991), and the Buddhist doctrine of No- Self 
(Chadha, forthcoming). In the case at hand, 
Molinism and the Lesson together suggest 
an error theory for anti- Depravity intuitions 
that is independent of Depravity: God doesn’t 
just randomly select for free decisions out of 
all the possible ones. His selection is biased 
in favor of His plans. Our intuitions about 
how free creatures will behave in randomly 
selected merely possible circumstances are 
therefore based on extrapolation from a bi-
ased sample. And that is an unreliable belief 
forming process. There is still the intuition 
that Depravity is false because the range of 
Depravity friendly assignments of probabili-
ties to the truth- values of counterfactuals of 
freedom is so small. But such intuitions are 
generated by Indifference and are therefore 
unreliably formed.
 (iii) has been used to defend merelogical 
nihilism (van Inwagen (1990)), monism 
(Schaffer (2007) and Sider (2007)), coun-
terpart theory (Lewis (1986)), utilitarianism 
(Hare (1981)), skepticism (Unger (1981)), 
and ontological indeterminism (Chalmers 
(2009)). Regarding D1, imagine I am wonder-
ing whether to pass my friend a screwdriver. 
Intuitively, it seems that the counterfactual 
“If I were to pass my friend the screwdriver, 
he would not stab me to death” is true. But 
if we assume divinely- induced bias is ab-
sent, then given D1, this counterfactual of 
freedom is almost certainly false. However, 
there is a paraphrase available. In particular, 
“Given divinely- induced bias, if I were to 
pass my friend the screwdriver, he would 
not stab me to death.” And since there is in 
fact divinely- induced bias, this paraphrase 
is useful. Regarding D2, there is no need to 
provide a paraphrase. For we live in a world 
with plenty of evil. So, in ordinary contexts, 
counterfactuals of freedom have the truth- 
values they seem to have.
 Eighth Objection: But this is just skepti-
cism! The idea that creatures respond to R1, 
R2, and R3 in this way has absolutely nothing 
going for it. I am merely offering a skeptical 
hypothesis. It may be dismissed.
 Reply: It is important to distinguish be-
tween a mere skeptical hypothesis and a skep-
tical result that is supported with argument. If 
had simply highlighted a skeptical possibility 
regarding anti- Depravity intuitions and left it 
at that, I would agree that what I have said 
should be dismissed. But I have argued for 
the relevant skeptical result. That argument 
is what the idea that creatures respond to 
R1, R2, and R3 in a Depravity friendly way 
has going for it. My argument is this: Given 
Molinism, anti- Depravity intuitions are gen-
erated by Indifference and observational 
bias. These are unreliable belief forming 
processes. Rejecting such intuitions yields a 
gain in explanatory power. And I have offered 
a useful paraphrase in place of the relevant 
intuitions. If intuitions are formed by unreli-
able processes, if rejecting those intuitions 
yields a gain in explanatory power, and if 
the intuitions can be replaced with a useful 
paraphrase, then such intuitions should be re-
jected. Thus, given Molinism, anti- Depravity 
intuitions should be rejected. Perhaps mere 
skeptical possibilities should be dismissed. 
But engagement with arguments supporting 
skeptical results is widespread in philosophy 
and that is as it should be. I discussed some 
skeptical arguments about intuitions regard-
ing the passage of time, the composition of 
objects, the self, and consciousness in reply 
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to the previous objection. Skeptical argu-
ments about intuitions regarding non- causal 
realism have been defended by Benacerraf 
(1973), Field (1989), Street (2006), Warren 
(2017). I have defended such skepticism 
as well in [Anonymized]. Skeptical argu-
ments about freewill have been defended by 
Pereboom (2001) and in the contributions to 
Caruso (2013). I see no basis for taking other 
skeptical arguments seriously but dismissing 
without engagement a skeptical argument 
regarding Molinism and freewill.
AFFILIATION?
NOTES
For comments and discussion I thank Mike Bertrand, Jody Graham, Bob Gruber, Ryan Hebert, Luis 
Oliveira, Kristian Olsen, Kenny Pearce, and Joshua Rasmussen. Special thanks to Felipe Leon, Alex-
ander Pruss, and numerous anonymous reviewers.
1. See van Fraassen (1989) and Hájek (2012).
2. I accept the Lesson. But I follow Hawthorne and Isaacs (manuscript, p. 12) in thinking that the 
Lesson is irrelevant to the fine- tuning argument. In particular, when physicists arrive at the judgment 
that the probability the universe would allow for life is low, they do not base their judgment on Indif-
ference. The appeal to Indifference is something philosophers mistakenly attribute to them. In general, 
in the main text I am trying to make as many standard assumptions as possible. Where I differ from a 
standard position, I will state that difference in a footnote.
3. Libertarianism is part of the standard formulation of Molinism. But I follow Perszyk (1998), (2000), 
and (2003) in thinking Molinism fits better with compatibilism.
4. See Plantinga (1974).
5. http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2016/04/two- kinds- of- free- will- theodicies.html
6. This objection was originally discussed by Alexander Pruss. See: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.
com/2016/06/an- argument- that- trans- world- depravity.html
7. See Otte (2009) and Pruss (2012).
8. This objection was originally discussed by Felipe Leon. See: http://exapologist.blogspot.
com/2012/03/is- plantingas- free- will- defense.html
9. This is the traditional view. My own view, discussed in Hill 2014, is that God is able to deceive. 
So, my own view is the Molinist is better off accepting something that is not quite Depravity. It is 
instead that, given Molinism, for all we know any world with free creatures will contain evil or God 
will systematically deceive every inhabitant in that world about whether there is evil to overcome and 
whether it has suffered.
10. One cost of Molinism that must be taken into account is the grounding objection discussed by 
Adams (1997) and Andrews, Thurow, and Hochsetter (2014). However, it can be mitigated somewhat. 
Although it is obscure what grounds counterfactuals of freedom, it is not obscure how they could have 
an explanation (See Pruss and Rasmussen (2014)). In addition to the Pruss/Rasmussen strategy, it seems 
to me that counterfactuals of freedom can be explained in terms of the beliefs, desires, and reasons of 
the agents of those counterfactuals of freedom. Furthermore, the grounding objection does not apply 
to Perszyk’s (2000) compatibilist version of Molinism.
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